RECENT CASES
dent Ins. Co. v. Sheftall & Co., 53 F. (2d) 40, 41 (C.C.A. 5th 1931)), § 77B, subdivision
(a) should likewise be interpreted not to include a foreclosure receivership. But the
language of § 3(a) (4) speaks of a receiver's being put in charge of the insolvent's
property. Those words are perhaps a stronger indication that a general liquidating
receivership was contemplated than are the words of subdivision (a) of § 77B referring
to a "proceeding in equity receivership." Furthermore, the necessity for forced sale
attends bankruptcy proceedings quite as much as it does foreclosure proceedings.
Hence, the most cogent reason for permitting a creditor to effect a transfer from a foreclosure proceeding to one under § 77B, that of avoiding a forced sale, is entirely absent
in the case of ordinary bankruptcy.
[NoTE.-On February 5,1936, after this note was set up, the Supreme Court affirmed the
principal case and reversed In re GranadaHotel Corp.]
Corporations-Amendment of Charter-Right of Minority Stockholder to Object to
Changes in Charter under Statute Subsequent to Incorporation-[Delaware].-Minority preferred stockholders of a Delaware corporation challenged the legality of an
amendment to its certificate of incorporation that abolished arrearages of cumulative
dividends amounting to $21.75 per share and changed each preferred share into five
common shares. The amendment was adopted by the required majority of the preferred stockholders, voting as a separate class. After the amendment was adopted, the
corporation declared a dividend on the common stock without providing for payment
of arrears on the preferred. The statute had provided when the corporation was
organized that the corporation could amend its articles by "increasing .... its
or by making any other change or alteration of its charter of
authorized stock ....
incorporation that may be desired .... Provided, however, that if any such proposed
amendment would alter or change the preferences given to any one or more classes of
preferred stock .... then the holders of .... each class of preferred stock so affected .... shall be entitled to vote as a class . . . ." Del. Rev. Stat. (1915) c. 65,
§ 26. The corporation act contained also the so-called reserved power provision:
and this chapter and all amendments thereof
"This chapter may be amended ....
shall be a part of the charter of every .... corporation . . . ." Del. Rev. Stat. (1915)
c. 65,§ 82. Prior to the adoption of the charter amendment in question § 26 of the
tatute had been amended in 1927 so as to authorize charter amendments "reclassifying" the shares and "changing the .... relative, participating .... or other special
rights of the shares ...... " 35 Del. Laws (1927) c. 85, § io. The objecting preferred
stockholders brought suit asking a declaration of the illegality of the amendment and
for a decree ordering the payment of the arrears of dividends on their shares. On demurrer to the bill, held, demurrer sustained. Keller v. Wilson & Co., i8o Atl. 584 (Del.
Ch. 1935).
It was conceded that the charter amendment would have been unauthorized had the
1927 amendment to § 26 not been enacted. Arrearages of preferred dividends had been
held something more than a "preference" and thus not subject to abolition under the
prior § 26, and this apparently regardless of whether the corporation then had a surplus from which the dividends might be paid. Morris v. Amer. Public Utilities Co., 14
Del. Ch. 136, 122 AUt. 696 (1923). Furthermore, as to a corporation organized after
1927, the amended § 26 has been held to authorize elimination of claims to accumulated dividends, again regardless of the corporate surplus. Harr.v. PioneerMeck. Corp.
65 F. (2d) 332 (C.C.A. 2d 1933). In the principal case the court held that the same

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
breadth of amending power was available to corporations organized prior to 1927 by
reason of the "reserved power" provision of § 82, following the decision in Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Ekc. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At. 654 (1928), which had involved
changes in dividend rights for future years but not accumulated unpaid dividends.
It was apparently clear that the 1927 amendment had been intended to apply to
existing corporation. Any contention by minority stockholders of such corporations
that the statute could not have this effect must be based upon the argument that to
give the statute such an operation would interfere with his contractual rights. But the
original statute, including § 82 as well as § 26, must be considered as having been written into any contract between the stockholders or between a stockholder and the corporation. Fletcher, Corporations § 3674 (perm. ed. I931). The crucial question, therefore, is one of the proper construction of the "reserved power clause" in § 82. It has
sometimes been suggested that the reservation should be considered as authorizing
only changes in the "contract" between the corporation and the state and not changes
in shareholders' contracts. Garey v. St. Joe Mit. Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907);
Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268 (1911). This suggestion affords no
solution, however, since any change necessarily affects rights of shareholders. It has
frequently been said that the reserved power does not extend to changes which affect
"vested rights." Yoakam v. Providence Biltnwre Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D.C. R.I.
1929); Fletcher, Corporations § 3680 (perm. ed. 1931). Such a statement, of course,
begs the question, and neither the courts nor other legal writers have been able to state
with any definiteness the proper scope of the power. Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and
Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. Pa.L. Rev. 585, 722 (1927); Curran, Minority Stockholders and theAmeudment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich.L. Rev. 743 (1934).
In general it has been agreed that changes in which the state or the public may have an
interest will more readily be found to fall within the reserved power. The stockholders
may be said to have been put on notice that such changes might later be forced on the
corporation or authorized by the legislature. The Delaware court in the principal case
and the Davis case cited above has been able to find a public interest behind changes in
preferred stock rights which may facilitate financing or improve corporate credit.
Other courts have taken a contrary view. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,
supra; Pronick v. SpiritsDistributingCo., 58 N.J. Eq. 97, 42 Atl. 586 (1899).
The objecting stockholders' contention becomes a constitutional one when he relies
on the prohibition of state legislation impairing the obligations of contracts. On the
constitutional issue, the state courts' construction of the reserved power provision as
written into the stockholders' contract would not be conclusive since in applying the
contract clause of the Constitution the United States Supreme Court will adopt its own
construction of the contract so as to prevent nullification of its jurisdiction. Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelly, i Black (U.S.) 436 (186I).
The principal case probably goes farther than any previous case in extending the
reserved power to cover authorization of changes affecting relative rights of existing
classes of shares. The trend in this direction has been noted. Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, 213 ff. (1934).
Corporations-Assignability of Claim against Directors for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty-[Massachusetts].-Minority stockholders of X corporation brought a suit in the
right of the corporation against its directors for breach of their fiduciary duty. Shortly
after the bill Was filed the directors, with the consent of the stockholders, sold and con-

